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Pay-as-you-go state pension schemes such as that operated in the United Kingdom face growing 
pressures from the rising old age dependency ratio and improvements to life expectancies.  
Alongside compulsory increases in the statutory retirement age, governments have used incentives 
to encourage workers to postpone voluntarily their exit from employment, deferring their Basic 
State Pension in exchange for the additional financial reward of an enhanced pension at a later point 
in time.  The impact of pension deferral upon the sustainability of the state pension system is 
dependent on the interplay of short term savings from payment delay and increased subsequent 
longer-term payments to pension recipients.  This article presents a model that simulates the 
financial effect of deferral uptake on the National Insurance Fund over a forty year projection under 
alternative scenarios, including current and revised post-2016 deferral incentives.  The findings 
indicate that the recent change in enhancement rate from 10.4 percent to 5.8 percent will 
significantly impact on state pension sustainability while still providing an incentive to defer.  We 
estimate that any reduction below 4 percent would result in zero uptake of the deferral option, based 
on a rational financial choice. 
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Like other OECD countries, the UK is facing the challenges of ensuring that the first pillar state 
pension system is both financially sustainable and socially just into the longer term.  There have 
been widespread legislative changes to the state pension system to address these challenges, such as 
equalising the state retirement age for men and women, followed up with increases to the retirement 
age for both genders.  Furthemore, within the UK’s state pension scheme there is the option to defer 
drawing the pension for a period of time in return for additional subsequent financial reward.  From 
the government’s perspective, state pension deferral delays payments to individuals making that 
choice but can entail the cost of higher subsequent payments.  This paper seeks to assess the extent 
to which the UK state pension deferral provisions can address the financial sustainability of state 
pension provision.  A comparison is presented of the cumulative impact of recent changes to the 
generosity of the deferral options on the National Insurance Fund from which UK state pension 
payments are made. 
The paper is organised as follows.  In the next section, the pressures faced by state pension 
schemes and the responses of governments are reviewed.  An exposition of the more recent 
developments to the UK state pension scheme is then presented with particular attention paid to the 
mechanisms for incentivising state pension deferral.  A simulation model of the UK state pension 
deferral mechanism, its policies and the possible future impacts on the financial position of the NIF 
is then presented.  A range of assumptions about deferral uptake are modelled and the implications 
of the results are evaluated with respect to Fund sustainability. 
 
  




Reforming the state pension 
Pension reform in the UK has manifested in a variety of ways, and has been driven by a range of 
economic and political considerations (Gilbert, 2004; Hills, 2004).  Many governments are 
confronting pension sustainability issues arising from declining support ratios, and thus fewer tax-
payers; and increased life-expectancy (Hock and Weil, 2012; Lee, 2014; Blake and Mayhew, 2006), 
which translates into more retirees dependent on social insurance benefits for longer periods 
(Poterba, 2014).  The UK state pension system is financed on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis where today’s 
benefits are paid for entirely with current payroll taxes.  Since there is little accumulation of 
tangible financial assets, only politically determined entitlements, the cash flow demand created by 
pension payments may not be matched by inflows from payroll taxes, with resulting surpluses or 
shortfalls where demographic changes are significant.  The UK state pension scheme finances 
benefits with contributions paid into the National Insurance Fund (NIF).  As noted above, this mode 
of financing makes it vulnerable to demographic ageing.  Government legislation has equalised the 
State Pension age (SPA) for men and women and raised the SPA in a staged and progressive 
manner (see the Pension Acts of 1995, 2007 and 2011). Whilst the NIF has historically remained in 
surplus, the future demands placed on it will increase despite the raising of the SPA.  A five-yearly 
review of the NIF (Llanwarne, 2014) has predicted that the Fund will be exhausted at some point 
during the next two decades. 
State pension deferral incentives can encourage later retirement from the workforce, helping 
to offset the demands placed on pension systems.  However, depending on the generosity of the 
incentive and its uptake, pressures on public finances may be alleviated only in the short term by 
state pension deferral (Farrar et al, 2012).  The trade-off between short-term savings and longer-
term payments is not necessarily an equal one. 
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Incentivising state pension deferral 
The National Insurance Scheme has allowed participants to defer drawing their state pension 
and draw an enhanced pension at a later point in time.  The extent of deferral uptake will clearly 
have a bearing on the Fund balance.  Key questions for policy makers are whether an overall 
benefit, in terms of pension sustainability, is likely to arise from pension deferral uptake; whether 
the magnitude of any such benefit is significant; and which party obtains the net benefit and which 
bears any corresponding costs.  Where an enhanced pension cash flow stream over-compensates the 
deferrer for pension payments foregone, an intergenerational transfer arises in which a negative 
payoff is borne by the subsequent generation of pension claimants. 
The specific deferral provisions have varied over time as government has sought to allow an 
appropriate degree of compensation to the deferrer for the pension payments foregone.  Disney and 
Smith (2002) modelled state pension deferral decisions using a simple two-period model applying a 
general utility function.  They concluded that accruing a 7.5 percent increment for each year of 
deferral would be actuarially fair for an average woman although not for a man, given their 
respective life expectancies.  The Pensions Act 2004 introduced the choice of either receiving a 
taxable lump sum payment following deferral or drawing an enhanced state pension, with 
retirement increments increased from 7.4 percent to 10.4 percent for each year deferred from 2010 
onwards.  Farrar et al (2012) modelled the financial benefits of the UK’s state pension deferral 
options, evaluating the options of receiving an enhanced pension with 10.4 percent enhancement 
increments or a lump-sum payment under a range of conditions.  Taking into account the combined 
effect of the deferred pension enhancement rate, forecasts of increasing life expectancy projections 
and the real terms pension increases, a strong financial incentive to defer was found for both sexes 
but particularly for women.  Similar conclusions were drawn for the UK system by Kanabar and 
Simmons (2016) in a life cycle setting that incorporated possible labour force participation.  
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Comparable studies in the US by Shoven and Slavov (2014), Rose (2015), and Glickman and 
Hermes (2015) also established that it was actuarially advantageous to defer receipt of benefits even 
for individuals with significantly higher mortality rates than the average.   
In view of the UK findings, coupled with the continual upward revision of life expectancies 
over time, the 10.4 percent enhancement rate certainly appears generous.  A report by The 
Government’s actuaries Department - GAD (2014) provided a wide range of potential ‘fair rates’ 
between 5.7 percent to 8.5 percent based on assumptions concerning life expectancy, gender, length 
of deferral period, rate of uprating on benefits, year of reaching SPA, and SPA in that year.  
Following this report, the enhancement rate decreased to 5.8 percent from 2016-17 (Gadd, 2015) 
while the lump-sum option was withdrawn.1 
The eventual future pension payments to individuals who defer under the revised provisions 
are lower in comparison to the previous provisions, implying a positive effect on NIF sustainability.  
However, in the short term the reduced attractiveness of the deferral provisions may result in lower 
uptake of the deferral option, increasing the short-term demands on the NIF.  The size of both 
benefits and costs to the NIF and their interplay over time depends on the degree of uptake of the 
pension deferral options and other relevant parameters. 
In the following section, we use a systems dynamics simulation model to assess the impact 
of recent changes in pension deferral incentives on the NIF under a range of alternative scenarios. 
 
                                                          
1 One of the key reasons for the policy change to a less generous and more actuarially fair pension deferral incentive is 
the rise in life expectancy.  To put the impact of rising life expectancy projections in context, the ONS estimated in their 
principal (main) projection that a man aged 65 in 2016 had a remaining life expectancy of 21.8 years and a woman aged 
65 would survive for a further 24.4 years.  For both genders, the projection indicated an increase in remaining life by 
1.1-1.2 years to these figures for each decade beyond. 
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III. Methodology: The state pension deferral system dynamics model 
System dynamics is a quantified method first developed by Forrester (1958; 1961) that uses 
differential equations, to simulate the time-evolutionary behaviour of causally driven non-linear 
complex systems.  Policy insights can be derived through testing scenario assumptions using a 
‘what-if’ approach.  Stock-flow diagrams are used to represent key accumulations or stocks and 
their inflows and outflows; stocks are dynamic in that their accumulations vary over time according 
to flow adjustments and may be decoupled by delays.  Within the state pension deferral mechanism 
there are multiple accumulations and flows of people, and cash and information flows linking 
pension entitlements to people and payments.  Non-linear relationships are associated with life 
expectancies and the time value of money, and there are inherent delays associated with deferral of 
pension drawings. 
The system dynamics simulation model was constructed and parameterised using IthinkTM 
software to express the UK state pension deferral mechanism as a system of difference equations.  
The structure and equations within the model are informed by data drawn from five government 
sources, namely: legislative changes to the state pension age (SPA); policy incentive parameters for 
deferral choice; deferral uptake statistics; population dynamics; and life expectancy projections. 
The assumptions parameterised within the model reflect recent data on deferral uptake 
(DWP, 2015a), which differ for men and women.  The model simulates a forty-year period from 
2016 to 2056 to test possible impacts on the National Insurance Fund (NIF) given a range of 
aggregate deferral decisions.  It should be noted that the model aims to measure the effect of 
deferral on the NIF payment burden rather than its overall balance, which will also depend on the 
flow of contributions into the Fund; effectively these are assumed to be invariant to the changes 
made in deferral incentives. 
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A stock-flow diagram representing the state pension deferral mechanism is outlined in 
Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Stocks within the model represent accumulations time of funds or persons, as determined by 
relevant dynamic flows over time.  At any point in time, a stock has a value determined by its initial 
value plus the sum of the net flows in each time period to date: 




Stocks that represent time spent in a particular state such as the periods of pension deferral and 
pension claiming are characterised by a delay D between inflow and outflow.  During this period, 
mortality at a rate m will reduce the outflow such that: 
Outflow (t) = inflow (t-D)e-mD 
The mortality rates parameterised within the model are time-specific and gender-specific. 
The stock representing the cumulative impact on the NIF is the sum of the series of payment flows 
over the simulation period: 




As shown in Figure 1, the stock-flow ageing chain is structured and parameterised to reflect 
the retirement population changes, impact of increases to the SPA, uprating of state pension 
payments and differing levels of deferral incentive 40 years into the future from the starting point of 
April 2016.  The choice either to draw the state pension immediately at SPA, or to defer drawing 
the pension results in two distinct stocks or accumulations beyond SPA.  Dynamic representations 
UK state pension deferral incentives and sustainability 
8 
 
of mortality are built into each stock as a drain on the numbers of people accumulated there using 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) cohort mortality projection data2.  State pension payments are 
determined by the accumulations of people drawing the Basic State Pension (BSP) and enhanced 
pensions. 
Moving from left to right through Figure 1, the detailed structure represents the flow of male 
retirees into SPA and beyond (the stock-flow structure is identical for men and women but with 
differing assumptions about the age starting point).  The flow of individuals into the ‘pre-retirement 
age’ stock is parameterised with time series data derived from ONS UK population projections to 
cover the simulation duration period3.   
At the starting point in 2016, men reach SPA at age 65 and women at age 63.  The SPA for 
both sexes will be equalised by 2018 under the Pensions Act 2011, with further phased future 
increases to 66 years from 2020, rising to 67 between 2026 and 2028, and 68 between 2044 and 
2046.  Measures for the further phased SPA increase for both sexes are parameterised as 
incremental dwell time in the pre-retirement stock in steps of one, two and three years at 
appropriate points.  The proportion of those at pre-retirement age who will not survive to SPA is 
reflected in the pre-pension mortality flow.  Those surviving will then move to either the ‘deferring 
pension’ stock or the ‘drawing pension’ stock, determined by the proportion deferring the pension.   
Assumptions are necessary at this point concerning the degree of uptake of the deferral 
option.  The rational choice to defer is parameterised in the model using a time series of binary 
values, derived exogenously from a comparison of the breakeven post-deferral survival period at 
which deferral is worthwhile and differing life expectancy projections over time.  We assume that 
individuals are rational and their choice to defer will reflect the financial attractiveness, or 
                                                          
2 Historic and Projected Mortality Rates (qx) from the 2010-based UK Life Tables: 1951-2060 (see 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-257453), Published 2012. 
3 2012-based National Population Projections, Published 2014 (see 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Population+Projections). 
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otherwise, of the strategy: if the enhanced pension value created by deferral does not compensate 
the individual for the loss of the payments that could have been claimed over the deferral period, 
no-one will choose to defer.  Following the approach of Farrar et al (2012), the values of the 
deferred and enhanced pension streams can be derived, with the weekly pension receipt stream 
being approximated as a continuous flow.  Pension receipts are assumed to grow at a rate g over the 
deferral period and the post-deferral pension claiming period.  The amount of a deferred pension 
receipt arising at time t, Pt, will be 
gt
t ePP 0  where P0 is the value of a before-tax pension receipt 
at the start of deferral.  The foregone amounts during the deferral period, D,  have an associated 
opportunity cost i, assumed to be a representative savings investment rate with no associated 
personal tax liability on the interest earned.  The pension receipts are assumed to be taxable at the 
individual’s marginal tax rate T, assumed constant over time.  Thus at the end of a period of 
deferral, the after-tax value of the deferred pension receipt will be )1()( TeP tDit 
 where D is the 





)(   , the value VF  of the foregone pension receipt stream at 







0 )1( . 
At the end of the deferral period, the non-enhanced pension receipt will be 
gDeP0  .  Denoting the 
enhancement rate as r, the additional value resulting from deferral will be 
gDeDPr 0 and the present 
value of an enhanced receipt at time t will be 
tiggDeeDPr )(0

. Thus, the value VE of the total after-tax 








0 )1(  
where n is the number of years of survival after the end of the deferral period. 
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The deferral decision will be rational if VE  > VF , with the breakeven survival period being the value 
of n at which VE  = VF . 
Assuming a personal savings rate of 1.4 percent4, a personal marginal tax rate of 20 percent5 
and a rate of pension growth of 3.3 percent6, breakeven survival periods are calculated for different 
assumed enhancement rates and deferral periods and compared with future year-specific cohort life 
expectancies.   Under these assumptions we find that where the enhancement rate is 10.4 percent or 
5.8 percent, there is a rational case for individuals of both sexes to defer under all life expectancy 
projections and all deferral periods modelled (two, four or six years); at a rate of 5.0 percent, the 
same is true for almost all combinations of these parameters.  In contrast, if the enhancement rate is 
3.0 percent or below, the analysis indicates no rational case for deferral for any combination of 
gender, deferral period or life expectancy projection throughout the simulation time period.  At an 
enhancement rate of 4.0 percent deferral is found to be worthwhile for some cohorts but not others, 
depending on the specific combination of parameters (state pension age, gender, deferral period and 
life expectancy) modelled, and therefore this enhancement rate may be regarded as approximating a 
minimum feasible policy value to incentivise deferral.  Hence, to gain insights into the impact of 
rational deferral choices on the NIF, we examine scenarios with as assumed enhancement rate of 
4.0 percent in addition to the 10.4 percent and 5.8 percent rates that have been applied in practice. 
Deferral uptake is assumed to be zero in scenarios where the breakeven survival period 
exceeds life expectancy.  Where deferral is financially worthwhile in a given year (life expectancy 
exceeds the breakeven survival period) a proportion of individuals will choose to do so, but not all.  
                                                          




5  This is the marginal tax rate faced by the majority of UK taxpayers (Number of individual income taxpayers by 
marginal rate, gender and age, 1990-91 to 2016-17, from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/616435/Table_2.1.pdf) 
6  Derived from estimated earnings growth forecasts, Office for Budget Responsibility: Economic and fiscal outlook, 
Cm9212, 2016 (http://cdn.budgetresponsibility.org.uk/March2016EFO.pdf). 
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This proportion is set at 2.83 percent for men and 5.70 percent for women, based on recent 
estimations of deferrers selecting an enhanced pension at the time when the enhancement rate of 
10.4 percent applied (see DWP, 2015a) which provided a clear financial incentive to defer; the low 
uptake even with this incentive is assumed to be determined by individuals’ consumption 
preference and other unknown aspects of utility which are assumed to remain invariant for differing 
financial incentives. 
The dwell time in the ‘drawing pension’ stock represents the non-deferrers’ remaining 
lifespan, parameterised using ONS cohort life expectancy projections7.  For those ‘deferring 
pension’, dwell time is governed by the pension deferral period which not all will survive.  Those 
surviving the deferral period then move to the ‘ex pension deferrers drawing enhanced pension’ 
stock with the dwell time there being determined again by ONS projections. 
Turning to the state pension payments, the total payment flow is categorised into two 
streams: payments to recipients who did not defer before drawing the state pension (‘drawing 
pension’ stock) and enhanced payments to recipients who deferred then drew the enhanced pension 
(‘ex pension deferrers drawing enhanced pension’).  The total ‘state pension payments’ flow 
incorporates the non-enhanced and enhanced pension payment streams as determined by the 
number of recipients of each type of payment and the assumed enhancement multiplier value and 
deferral period. 
The parameterisation of the state pension payment stream in terms of the initial amount, 
indexation over time, and appropriate discount rate follows the approach of GAD’s Quinquennial 
Review (Llanwarne, 2014).  The initial (non-indexed) annual state pension payment is set at 
                                                          
7 The projections are derived from the 2012-based Historic and projected expectations of life (ex) from the 2012-based 
life tables: Principal projection (ONS, 2014), available at 
http://ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Life+Expectancies. 
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£7,6708 with subsequent increases determined by an indexing factor based on upratings in line with 
the triple lock policy each year, assuming projected annual earnings growth figures taken from 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook data (EFO2015)9.  Following the assumption of Llanwarne (2014), 
the discount rate is set at 3.15 percent in nominal terms, representing a proxy for the long-term 
index-linked investment return needed to make projections of the balance of the National Insurance 
Fund.  The enhancement multiplier, reflecting the rate of increase in the state pension for deferrers, 
was parameterised for comparison purposes with rates of 10.4 percent, 5.8 percent or 4 percent, as 
described above. 
The impact of state pension deferral decisions on the NIF is simulated under three scenarios 
reflecting principal, low and high life expectancy, using data from the respective ONS (2014) 
projections.  Each scenario encompasses deferral periods of two, four and six years for both men 
and women, reflecting a reasonable range of assumptions10.  The cumulative difference in the total 
present value of payments to both male and female recipients under each scenario, compared with 
the corresponding no-deferral case, is derived by comparison of the outputs from the system 
dynamics model and represented graphically. 
  
                                                          
8 This figure is derived from Llanwarne’s assumptions that the new State Pension will be set at £155.25 per week in 
2016 in nominal terms and that the long-run average level of entitlement to this amount will be 95%.  Complexities in 
the estimation of average entitlement arise from, for example, adjustments relating to participation in contracted-out 
occupational pension schemes.  The extent to which these adjustments may impact on the post-2016 average state 
pension payment is not quantifiable at present based on any publicly available information. 
9 http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/economic-fiscal-outlook-july-2015/. 
10 The range of assumed deferral periods chosen for this analysis is informed by data reported in the Freedom of 
Information Request – 2773/2011 which indicates that for both men and women an average deferral period is between 
three and four years. 




Scenario 1: Principal life expectancy based projections 
The first scenario simulated is informed by the most likely of the ONS life expectancy projections – 
the principal (main) projection, where modest improvements to life expectancy are assumed.  
Graphical presentation of the outputs for each scenario is presented in Figures 2a-3c.  Similarities 
can be seen in the trajectories across gender, deferral period and uptake and the higher enhancement 
rate assumptions but not for the lower rates. 
INSERT FIGURES 2a-3c ABOUT HERE 
As the deferral period increases, the cumulative saving curve at the 5.8 percent and 10.4 
percent pushes upwards over time with the cumulative saving being much greater for women than 
men, reflecting the higher female deferral uptake and longer female life expectancy.  It can be seen 
that where the pre-2016 provision of 10.4 percent enhancement rate is assumed, the cumulative 
savings curve eventually becomes negative in each of Figures 2a-3c.  The interpretation here is that 
the total present value of the future pension payment stream will be greater than it would have been 
if no deferral had occurred, and this is so for both men and women.  The observation is clearly 
consistent with the perception that the previous policy of using a 10.4 percent enhancement rate was 
generous to the deferrer.  From a government perspective, the initial savings to the NIF from 
reduced pension payments made as a consequence of deferral are more than offset by the impact of 
consequently higher pension payments. 
Where a 5.8 percent enhancement rate is assumed as per the revised post 2016 provision, the 
cumulative savings curve closely follows the corresponding curve for the 10.4 percent rate 
assumption over the early years of the simulation until around the mid-2020s.  This similarity arises 
partly as a result of zero pension payments being made to deferrers over the actual deferral period, 
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regardless of the eventual amount they will be paid following deferral, and partly because the 
curves represent cumulative amounts that do not differ significantly between simulations until a 
longer term horizon is reached.  From the mid-2020s onwards it can be seen that the trajectories for 
the 5.8 percent and 10.8 percent enhancement rates diverge radically, indicating substantially higher 
savings to the NIF under the revised provision. 
An interesting difference in the shape of the curves can be seen when comparing the 
trajectories for men (Figures 2a-2c) with the corresponding ones for women (Figures 3a-3c).  In 
each of the assumed deferral periods, the female trajectories suggest that cumulative savings from 
deferral will still eventually become negative even at the reduced 5.8 percent enhancement rate, 
with turning points in the trajectories event from the mid-simulation period.  In the two year 
deferral case this does in fact occur at the end point of the simulation.  In contrast, for men, the 
cumulative savings curves remain clearly positive throughout the simulation period.  This suggests 
that for women, but not for men, the revised 5.8 percent rate may still represent a generous 
compensation for the pension payments foregone during deferral. 
Where a lower enhancement rate of 4.0 percent is assumed some interesting dynamics are 
displayed.  Taking the case of men deferring for two years (Figure 2a) the cumulative savings to the 
NIF are positive and grow throughout the simulation period, whereas, for four and six year deferral 
(Figures 2b and 2c) take up is zero reflecting the rational choice not to defer.  For women, we see a 
similar pattern for two year deferral (Figure 3a).  In contrast, where women choose to defer for four 
years (Figure 3b) the Fund runs a small consistent saving up to around 2036 followed by a strong 
increase.  This pattern reflects increasing attractiveness and uptake of deferral, as the increase in 
women’s life expectancy more than offsets the planned step increases in SRA in the first two 
decades of the simulation run.  Deferring for six years (Figure 3c) is worthwhile for women towards 
the end of the simulation period in the 2050s but deferral uptake is very low up to that point. 
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In summary, it can be seen that across Figures 2a-3c the cumulative savings are variable 
with trajectories sensitive to both enhancement rate modifications and deferral period assumptions. 
Unsurprisingly, the degree of uptake of deferral is a principal determinant of the impact of the 
deferral provisions on the NIF. 
 
Scenario 2: Low life expectancy variant projections 
The second scenario is informed by the ONS’s low life expectancy projections, where slight 
improvements to life expectancy over time are assumed. 
Broadly, the same features can be observed that were described for the principal projection 
where the enhancement rate is applied at 5.8 and 10.4 percent.  From Figures 4a to 5c it is evident 
that the cumulative savings to the NIF for women are greater than those for men, consistent with 
Figures 2a-3c.  In addition, the trajectories for these enhancement rates are similar to those of the 
principal projections over approximately the first twenty years of the simulation period.  This 
reflects the choice of starting point in the simulation model where individuals are at SPA in 2016 
and therefore the impact of mortality is very low over this initial period.  Over the latter half of the 
simulation period, the aging of the cohorts that previously entered SPA becomes more significant, 
with the consequence that mortality rates are higher and the impact of life expectancy assumptions 
becomes more important.  The curves in each of the graphs for 5.8 and 10.4 percent shift slightly 
upwards compared to the corresponding principal projections, with the divergence slightly 
increasing as the deferral period becomes longer.  This difference in savings is determined mainly 
by the lower cost of servicing the enhanced pension payment commitment and also by the greater 
number of deferrers not surviving the deferral period. 
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Where a 4.0 percent enhancement rate is considered, as with Figures 2a. to 3c, the 
trajectories are very different.  For men (Figures 4a. to 4c.) the impact on the NIF is zero as there is 
no rational case for deferral across all deferral periods.  With regard to women (Figures 5a. to 5c.), 
since deferral is worthwhile only in the early part of the time period modelled and then only for two 
or four years, the impact of these choices on the Fund is very minimal.  Throughout most of the 
simulation period the rational choice is not to defer as the phased increases in SPA grow at a faster 
rate than life expectancy. 
INSERT FIGURES 4a-5c ABOUT HERE 
 
Scenario 3: High life expectancy variant projections 
The third scenario simulated is informed by the ONS’s high life expectancy projections, where 
more significant improvements to life expectancy are assumed. 
Again, the high life expectancy scenarios shown in Figures 6a to 7c follow a broadly 
consistent pattern to those of the principal and low life expectancy projections where the 5.8 and 
10.4 percent enhancement rates are assumed, particularly in the first half of the simulation period.  
Turning points later in the simulation trajectories are observed for both men and women.  However, 
it is noticeable that the trajectories for men show a downward movement in savings on the curves in 
the later part of the simulation runs.  This indicates that the cost of servicing the enhanced pension 
payments is more significant, relative to the initial deferral savings achieved, in comparison to the 
other life expectancy scenarios. 
Where the 4.0% enhancement rate is assumed, two year deferral is rational for men 
throughout the course of the simulation.  At later points in the simulation deferral for longer periods 
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is also rational as a result of increasing life expectancy: for example, by 2038 deferral is worthwhile 
even for six years.  For the case of women, deferral is appropriate under all conditions throughout 
the simulation time. 
INSERT FIGURES 6a-7c ABOUT HERE 
 
Summary of simulation results 
Across the scenarios modelled, some interesting patterns appear.  Under all assumptions 
made, the 10.4 percent enhancement rate is associated with a long-term cumulative cost to the NIF.  
When comparing the impact of differing deferral incentives it can be seen that the policy change 
from an enhancement rate of 10.4 percent to one of 5.8 percent will strongly affect the long term 
cumulative saving, or cost, to the NIF as a result of deferral, assuming uptake of the option remains 
unchanged at current levels.  In the shorter term, by contrast, the difference will be relatively small.  
The impact of changing life expectancy assumptions becomes significant over the later part of the 
time period simulated, in particular in the case of men where low life expectancy is combined with 
a long deferral period, as would be expected. 
A clear difference is shown between the male and corresponding female trajectories.  For 
both sexes a 10.4 percent enhancement rate leads eventually to a net cost to the NIF, although this 
cost is much more significant for women.  Under the 5.8 percent enhancement rate, for men, the 
cumulative savings curve approximates to a steady state after about 30 years except in the case of 
six year deferral combined with low life expectancy, where the cumulative savings continue to rise 
over the simulation period.  By contrast for women, in all simulation runs the cumulative savings 
curves eventually peak and then start to fall, including all cases with a 5.8 percent enhancement rate 
assumption.   
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Where a 4.0 percent hypothetical enhancement rate is applied, a wider range of trajectories 
is illustrated reflecting the variability in rational deferral choice across the scenarios modelled.  For 
women, the rational choice to defer is present throughout most of the simulation runs, whereas with 
men deferral is a rational choice only where higher life expectancy and shorter deferral periods are 
assumed. 
Figure 8a illustrates the magnitude of the difference in the total present value of cumulative 
savings to the NIF, arising as a result of the revised enhancement incentive, up to the simulation 
horizon in 2056.  Figure 8b shows the corresponding impact that would have resulted from a change 
to a 4.0 percent enhancement rate. 
INSERT FIGURES 8a-8b ABOUT HERE 
The final values of the scenario simulation runs are dependent on the simulation endpoint of 
2056 which is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but they are indicative of the direction of the long-term 
impact of pension deferral in relation to specific factors. 
It can be seen from Figure 8a that in all cases there is a significant financial benefit to the 
NIF arising from the switch to a lower enhancement rate.  The saving is more substantial in 
simulations where the assumed pension deferral period is longer (and enhanced pension payments 
are therefore greater); where assumed life expectancy is longer (reflecting the longer series of 
expected pension payments in each case).  The savings relating to women are greater in comparison 
to men, due to higher pension deferral uptake among women and longer female life expectancy in 
each of the ONS projections. 
By contrast, if the enhancement rate were to have been reduced to 4.0 percent (Figure 8b) it 
can be observed that the savings would be much lower where the low life expectancy scenario is 
assumed, particularly with respect to men, and much greater with high life expectancy, especially in 
UK state pension deferral incentives and sustainability 
19 
 
relation to women.  In the high life expectancy scenario, as in Figure 8a, a clear relationship can be 
seen between the length of deferral period and the saving to the NIF.  For the other scenarios the 
pattern is less clear, reflecting the variable uptake of the deferral option over time. 
The case that corresponds most closely to real world data assumes the ONS principal life 
expectancy projection and a deferral period of four years on reaching SPA.  Figure 8a shows that 
the combined total cumulative saving for both men and women up to the 2056 simulation horizon is 
approximately £25.0bn, assuming that deferral uptake remains unchanged at its 2016 level.  The 
comparable result in Figure 8b is not significantly different at approximately £25.7bn, although 
there is much greater variability across the life expectancy projections.  To contextualise these 
figures, spending on the Basic State Pension in 2014-15 was £67 billion representing 3.7 percent of 
GDP (DWP, 2015b).  Hence, although the impact of state pension deferral on the National 
Insurance Fund is relatively small in absolute terms, the cumulative savings are significant over the 
40 year simulation period. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Incentivising the deferral of retirement can be viewed both as a government response to the 
sustainability of state pension provision and as a measure that enables people to exercise a level of 
control over their retirement planning.  This paper has assessed the impact of the uptake of UK state 
pension deferral options on the burden of state pension provision, as represented by its impact on 
the National Insurance Fund using a system dynamics simulation model of the UK Basic State 
Pension deferral system that models the current provisions, the revised incentive that applies from 
April 2016 and an alternative value that approximates the minimum feasible incentive. 
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With respect to the role of pension deferral in helping to achieve state pension sustainability, 
it is evident that under the existing deferral enhancement provisions where a 10.4 percent annual 
enhancement rate is available for each year of deferral, the financial impact on the NIF is negative 
in the longer term in all cases simulated in our analysis, reflecting the generosity of this recently 
discontinued enhancement rate.  Short term savings to the government (reflecting the pension 
payments foregone by deferrers) are followed by generous enhanced payments that benefit deferrers 
but represent greater longer term costs to the government (and hence to later generations of pension 
claimants, assuming the source fund is not unlimited).  This implies a rolling intergenerational 
transfer of pension obligations with the burden always falling on future generations. 
Our analysis shows that, under the assumptions made, the impact of this on the NIF will 
clearly be mitigated by modifying the enhancement rate to one which does not over-compensate the 
deferrer.  Under all simulations modelled, we find an incentive to defer in all time periods where the 
enhancement rate is 10.4 percent or 5.8 percent.  Reduction to 4.0 percent results in a variable 
picture where specific life expectancy scenarios lead to very different financial outcomes.  Our 
analysis indicates that substantial savings will be made to the Fund, at least in the short to medium 
term, where the enhancement rate offered is sufficient to provide a financial incentive to defer.  
Under differing life expectancy projections, it is clear that longer life expectancy is associated with 
greater savings as a result of the policy change from an enhancement rate of 10.4 percent to one of 
5.8 percent, and additional savings would result at a rate of 4.0 percent.  This is particularly true in 
relation to women.  From a policy perspective, our analysis suggests that a slightly lower incentive 
than the recently revised 5.8 percent would still be acceptable to many individuals approaching 
retirement while still aiding the long-term viability of the NIF.  Within our analysis we have not 
attempted to model behavioural changes in response to differing deferral incentives, other than the 
rational financial choice, and any associated incremental changes in the total contributions to the 
National Insurance Fund.  These may be significant, depending on the numbers of older workers 
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remaining longer in the workforce11.  Further investigation could be conducted into this aspect 
when empirical data on the uptake response to the recent changes becomes available. 
From the individual perspective, pension deferral can be a rational choice in that the 
financial benefits may exceed the costs, depending on factors such as remaining life expectancy, the 
existence and extent of any substitute sources of income, the individual’s marginal tax rates in work 
and in retirement and their personal consumption preference.  The relaxation of restrictions on the 
use of personal or occupational pension funds and the enforcement of anti-age discrimination in 
employment opportunities facilitate the uptake of alternative sources of income in later life.  In this 
context, state pension deferral can help enable individuals to create their optimal overall retirement 
income strategy without contributing to an excessive financial burden to future generations. 
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Figure 2a: Two Year Deferral   Figure 2b: Four Year Deferral   Figure 2c: Six Year Deferral 
Figure 2a-2c. Male principal life expectancy projection vs cumulative savings to the NIF 
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Figure 3a: Two Year Deferral        Figure 3b: Four Year Deferral   Figure 3c: Six Year Deferral 
Figure 3a-3c. Female principal life expectancy projection vs cumulative savings to the NIF 
  




                       
Figure 4a: Two Year Deferral      Figure 4b: Four Year Deferral            Figure 4c: Six Year Deferral 
Figure 4a-4c. Male low life expectancy projection vs cumulative savings to the NIF 
  




                      
 Figure 5a: Two Year Deferral    Figure 5b: Four Year Deferral    Figure 5c: Six Year Deferral 
Figure 5a-5c. Female low life expectancy projection vs cumulative savings to the NIF 
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Figure 6a: Two Year Deferral      Figure 6b: Four Year Deferral   Figure 6c: Six Year Deferral 
Figure 6a-6c. Male high life expectancy projection vs cumulative savings to the NIF 
  




                    
Figure 7a: Two Year Deferral        Figure 7b: Four Year Deferral           Figure 7c: Six Year Deferral 
Figure 7a-7c. Female high life expectancy projection vs cumulative savings to the NIF 
  





Figure 8a. Total cumulative savings up to 2056 arising from reducing the enhancement rate from 10.4 to 5.8 percent  





Figure 8b. Total cumulative savings up to 2056 that would arise from reducing the enhancement rate from 10.4 to 4.0 percent  
